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On 29 January, the administration of President Donald Trump sent Congress a batch of doc-
uments which provide the basis for a possible further expansion of sanctions against Russia: 
a report on the Russian business and political elite, and a report on the consequences of se-
lected financial sanctions. At the same time, the authorisation for the possible introduction of 
extraterritorial sanctions against entities from the Russian security sector and arms industry 
came into effect. This was in line with the requirements of the Countering America’s Adversar-
ies Through Sanctions Act, No. 3364 from 2 August 2017. This Act covers US sanctions against 
Iran, Russia and North Korea. As of now, President Trump’s administration has not decided to 
implement any new sanctions against Russia, although it has the ability to do so at any time. 
The absence of new sanctions and the publi-
cation of an extensive and purely formal list of 
members of the Russian business and political 
elites by the US administration has, on the one 
hand, been received in Russia with some relief. 
The Kremlin’s decisions and the actions taken by 
Russian businessmen have demonstrated that 
Russia had been preparing itself for a ‘black 
scenario’ of new, severe, and precisely targeted 
US sanctions. On the other hand, the Russian 
reactions reveal their continuing uncertainty 
regarding Washington’s intentions. The Krem-
lin is clearly unsure whether the US decisions 
represent a step back and a desire for a limit-
ed normalisation of relations with Russia (thus 
revealing the relative weakness of the Ameri-
can government), or a sophisticated strategy 
of keeping a constant threat over Russia’s head 
of increasingly tough sanctions that could be 
triggered at a time convenient for Washington. 
The Kremlin is obsessively worried that such 
sanctions might be introduced right before the 
presidential elections in March, with the aim of 
destabilising the domestic political situation.
 Therefore, even though no new sanctions have 
been introduced, they have partly achieved the 
desired effects by creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and unpredictablity for the Kremlin. 
Russia’s future behaviour will depend on wheth-
er and what kind of new sanctions the US gov-
ernment will impose during the coming weeks 
and months. If Washington fails to impose sig-
nificant new sanctions, or imposes merely sym-
bolic ones, it will encourage Moscow to harden 
its stance and become more assertive. Compre-
hensive and very painful sanctions, especially if 
introduced before the elections, could spur the 
Kremlin to respond aggressively and asymmetri-
cally. In turn, painful but selective sanctions are 
likely to incline Moscow to make concessions, 
especially with regard to regional conflicts.
The US’s sanctions against Russia
Act No. 33641, adopted at the initiative of Con-
gress, confirms all the previously introduced 
1 For the full text of Act No. 3364, see https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364
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sanctions against Russia and imposes new ones; 
this not only makes it more difficult for Presi-
dent Donald Trump to lift them, should he wish 
to, but also requires him to monitor and make 
periodic assessments of Russia’s behaviour, in 
order to consider imposing tougher sanctions 
if the Kremlin perseveres with policies harmful 
for American interests2. In accordance with the 
requirements of this Act:
• On 29 January 2018 (180 days after the act 
comes into force), the US President sent Con-
gress a report on Russian parastatal entities 
(companies partially or entirely controlled by 
the state) and members of the Russian busi-
ness and political elite (Russian politicians and 
oligarchs with close ties to Vladimir Putin, 
the Russian ruling elite, and members of their 
families). This report consists of two parts. 
The public part lists 210 individuals, includ-
ing 114 Russian state officials: functionaries 
of the President’s Administration, ministers, 
heads of government agencies, the speakers 
of both chambers of Parliament, members of 
the Security Council, and the heads of the larg-
est state-owned companies; as well as the 96 
richest Russians with fortunes that are valued 
at $1 billion or more3. 22 people from this list 
have already been covered by individual sanc-
tions (i.e. a freeze of their assets in the United 
States, a ban on American entities conclud-
ing any transactions with such persons or the 
companies they control, and a ban on them 
entering the United States). The second part 
of the report – which is confidential – allegedly 
(in accordance with the requirements of Act 
No. 3364) details the involvement of these per-
sons in corrupt transactions, as well as the size 
and origins of their assets, including the finan-
cial status of their spouses, children, parents 
2 For more on Act No. 3364, see I. Wiśniewska, S. Kardaś, 
‘Ustawa o amerykańskich sankcjach przeciwko Rosji’, 
OSW Analizy, 4 August 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-08-04/ustawa-o-amerykans-
kich-sankcjach-przeciwko-rosji
3 For a complete list of the names listed in the public 
portion of the report: http://prod-upp-image-read.
ft.com/40911a30-057c-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
and siblings. This part of the report is also said 
to include assessments of Russian parastatal 
entities, information about their management 
structure and beneficial ownership and their 
international ties, as well as their significance 
for the Russian economy. The document also 
allegedly presents the exposure of key sectors 
of US economy (in particular in banking, insur-
ance, securities and real estate) to Russian po-
litical and business figures, and the parastatal 
entities enumerated in the report. As suggest-
ed by the US administration, the confidential 
part may also contain the names of more Rus-
sian citizens. The presentation of this report to 
Congress did not mean the introduction of any 
new sanctions against the Russian business and 
political elite, as underlined in the report itself.
• Another report submitted to Congress on 29 
January included an analysis of the potential 
effects banning American entities from dealing 
in any new Russian sovereign debt . The report 
concludes that this type of restriction would 
not only be a blow to the Russian economy, but 
would also affect American entities and have 
negative consequences for the global financial 
market. For the time being, the US administra-
tion has decided not to take such steps.
• Act No. 3364 also obliged the President – at 
any time starting on 29 January (i.e. 180 days 
after the act comes into force) – to impose 
sanctions against persons engaging in ‘signifi-
cant’ transactions with the Russian intelligence, 
military and arms industry. In October 2017 the 
administration had already specified 39 entities 
in these sectors (of which 30 had already been 
covered by US sanctions)4. The criteria under 
4 For a complete list of entities: https://www.state.gov/t/
isn/caatsa/275116.htm
So far, President Trump’s administration 
has not decided to introduce any new 
restrictions against Russia.
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which these transactions will be considered 
‘significant’ have not been revealed. For the 
time being, the US administration has decided 
not to exercise this option.
In parallel with the sanctions against Russia 
arising from Act No. 3364, the US Govern-
ment is regularly updating the specially desig-
nated nationals and blocked persons list. For 
example, on 26 January 2018 these lists were 
expanded to include Russian companies and 
individuals associated with the delivery of Sie-
mens turbines to occupied Crimea, as well as 
entities involved in trade (mainly steel and coal) 
between the occupied Donbas region & Russia 
and other countries. 
Russia’s preventive actions
Act No. 3364, which obliges the US adminis-
tration to closely monitor the situation in Rus-
sia, and encourages it to implement successive 
sanctions against that country, sparked huge 
concern among the Russian business and po-
litical elite, as demonstrated by the actions 
subsequently taken by the Kremlin and Russian 
oligarchs. The Kremlin has been clearly obses-
sively worried that sanctions would be imposed 
right before the presidential elections in March, 
which in their opinion would constitute a dest-
abilisation of the domestic political situation.
In view of the above, the Kremlin has first of 
all tried to convince Washington of the need to 
normalise Russian/American relations, and of 
its readiness for constructive cooperation with 
the US, especially in the area of international 
security (particularly with regard to Syria, North 
Korea and Ukraine), if Washington withholds 
further sanctions. As far as we can discern, the 
proposals Russia submitted were purely declar-
atory and did not include any specific promises 
to discontinue the activities Washington per-
ceives as being harmful to the United States 
and its allies. Moscow’s proposals included 
the reactivation of the three regular commu-
nications channels between Russia & the USA: 
political, military and special services (in March 
2017); starting bilateral consultations concern-
ing cyber-security; and an exchange of dec-
larations between the two countries about 
not interfering in the other’s domestic affairs 
(in July 2017). These proposals were rejected by 
Washington as insufficient.
However, Russian and US intelligence services 
and the military continued to maintain contacts 
in order to the fight against terrorism and to 
avoid incidents in Syria (the so-called ‘decon-
fliction agreement’). In December 2017 Russia 
announced that it had been able to prevent 
a terrorist attack in St. Petersburg with the aid 
of information obtained from the CIA. 
It should be assumed that another element 
of Russian policy aimed at persuading the 
United States not to introduce new sanctions, 
especially against the Russian secret servic-
es and enterprises in the armaments sector, 
was the unprecedented visit to Washington 
at the end of January 2018 by three heads of 
the Russian special services: Sergei Naryshkin, 
the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service; 
Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of the Federal 
Security Service; and Igor Korobov, the head 
of military intelligence (GRU). Both Naryshkin 
and Korobov are covered by US sanctions, in-
cluding a travel ban to the United States. Nar-
yshkin’s visit was revealed on 30 January by 
Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s ambassador in the 
United States; the others’ visit was reported 
by the Washington Post, according to which 
Bortnikov and Naryshkin met Mike Pompeo, 
the head of the CIA, among others. The meet-
ing supposedly concerned the fight against 
terrorism.
The Kremlin is obsessively worried that 
the US might introduce sanctions to 
destabilise the situation in Russia be-
fore the presidential elections.
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It is most likely that the heads of the Russian 
intelligence services came to Washington to 
persuade the US administration that the intro-
duction of new sanctions would have a very 
negative impact on their ongoing cooperation. 
Presumably they offered enhanced consulta-
tion and cooperation with the US on issues 
relating to the fight against terrorism, as well 
as cooperation on regional conflicts affecting 
American interests (North Korea, the Middle 
East and Afghanistan).
At the same time, the Russian authorities have 
been taking steps to shield the Russian securi-
ty sector and arms industry from future sanc-
tions. First of all (by a regulation of November 
2017), the Russian government permitted state 
corporations and the Defence Ministry, the 
Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Service not to disclose information about 
their transactions, including information about 
their business partners (vendors, contractors, 
etc.) until 1 July 2018. According to unofficial 
reports, Russian companies had complained 
that they were having difficulty finding foreign 
counterparties because of the American sanc-
tions (this allegedly applied to Roskosmos and 
Rostech, among others, especially after the 
scandal concerning the supply of Siemens tur-
bines to occupied Crimea). 
Secondly, the Ministry of Finance decided to con-
centrate the financial servicing of the arms com-
panies and the Ministry of Defence in a single 
state bank. Russian media have speculated that 
this role was granted to Promsviazbank, which 
until December 2017 had been one of the larg-
est private banks in Russia, although due to fi-
nancial problems it underwent restructuring and 
passed under the control of the central bank. 
At the same time, the central bank ceased pub-
lishing information about which Russian banks 
were authorised to process transactions con-
cerning public procurement in the defence sec-
tor. These two decisions were related to Russian 
banks’ concerns over the next round of Amer-
ican sanctions. For example, in December the 
private Alpha Bank reported that it was ceasing 
cooperation with Russian armaments companies 
for fear of reprisals from the United States.
Thirdly, within the military-industrial commit-
tee (a key body assigning military contracts) 
a special team was created with the specific 
task of ensuring a smooth fulfilment of mili-
tary contracts by the arms sector in conditions 
of the anticipated expansion of the sanctions 
(the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin re-
vealed this fact in January 2018). 
The Russian authorities have also undertaken 
activities aimed at creating favourable con-
ditions for Russian oligarchs (especially those 
at risk of US sanctions) to move their capital 
to Russian jurisdiction. First of all, Vladimir Pu-
tin has declared that in 2018 the Russian gov-
ernment will issue special anonymous sover-
eign bonds denominated in foreign exchange. 
According to the Russian Ministry of Finance, 
these Eurobonds (worth around US$3 billion) 
will be issued within the framework of the do-
mestic Russian financial infrastructure; these in-
struments will not trade on the secondary mar-
ket, and their owners will not appear on the 
international lists of depositaries.
Secondly, an amnesty on capital repatriated 
to Russia by individuals and legal entities will 
be introduced by the end of 2018. The assets 
and foreign accounts which individuals have 
declared will be exempt in Russia from respon-
sibility for tax infringements and taxation for 
previous years. Russian residents liquidating 
their companies in tax havens will be able to 
move their assets to Russia without suffering 
any tax consequences. 
The Russian government has undertaken 
a series of actions aimed at limiting the 
negative effects of introduction of new 
sanctions by Washington to the Russian 
economy.
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In recent months, Russian businessmen have 
also taken a number of actions which can be 
interpreted as attempts to avoid US sanctions, 
or minimise their losses should they be im-
posed. These have primarily focused on lobby-
ing against being included on the list of people 
associated with the Kremlin, through American 
law firms and experts in Washington. 
The last year has also seen Russian business-
men making a number of financial transactions 
which will limit their losses if the sanctions are 
extended; in particular this involves reducing 
the assets they hold abroad. To list some ex-
amples: at the end of 2017 Viktor Vekselberg 
(owner of the Renova Group) sold his shares in 
the Petropavlovsk gold mining company (reg-
istered in the UK); in May 2017 Kirill Shamalov 
(the youngest billionaire in Russia, and proba-
bly President Putin’s ex-son-in-law) sold 17% of 
the shares (he still retains 3.9%) in the chemical 
company Sibur to Leonid Mikhelson, the chair-
man and largest shareholder in the gas compa-
ny Novatek (which is subject to US sanctions), 
who in December 2017 handed over 14.4% of 
the shares to the board of Gazprombank, re-
ducing his stake in Sibur to 34%. As a result, the 
share in Sibur held by businessmen potential-
ly vulnerable to American sanctions has fallen 
below 50%, which means that if they are sub-
jected to individual sanctions, the restrictions 
will not be automatically extended to Sibur as 
a company. Meanwhile in August 2017 Mikhail 
Prokhorov sold 7% of shares in Rusal (a compa-
ny registered on the Channel Island of Jersey), 
and in December 2017 he sold 49% of shares in 
the US basketball club the Brooklyn Nets (31% 
of which he retains). Alfa Bank (the biggest pri-
vate bank in Russia) initially announced it would 
cease its cooperation with the Russian arma-
ment industry in December 2017, and in Janu-
ary 2018 it closed its branch office in New York. 
In October 2017 Polina Deripaska (since 2001 
the wife of Oleg Deripaska,  although Russian 
media have recently rumoured that the couple 
have divorced) became the owner of almost 7% 
of the shares of the En+ Group (a vertically inte-
grated aluminium-energy company controlled 
by Oleg Deripaska); these shares were worth 
around US$500 million, thus making her one of 
the richest women in Russia.
As the Russian media have speculated, divorces 
may be one of the ways in which Russian oli-
garchs can minimise their losses from potential 
sanctions. In this way, their spouses and chil-
dren (who often live outside Russia) could be 
protected from restrictions (in particular con-
cerning visas), and some of their assets can be 
transferred as a result of the division of prop-
erty. Recently, the media have reported on the 
divorces of Yekaterina Tikhonova (probably the 
daughter of President Putin) and Kirill Sham-
alov (January 2018); Roman Abramovich and 
Daria Zhukova (reports about their separation 
appeared on 7 August 2017); and Igor Sechin 
(who is covered by individual US sanctions) and 
his wife Olga (in May 2017).
Russian reactions to the reports submit-
ted to Congress
For months the Kremlin had been preparing 
for a ‘black scenario’: the introduction of fur-
ther restrictions, especially on the armaments 
sector. It feared that the US administration, 
with the cooperation of intelligence services, 
would select a narrow group of people from 
the president’s ‘inner circle’ and hit them with 
new sanctions. In spite of these fears, the list 
automatically named Russian government offi-
cials, the presidents of the largest state com-
panies (most likely based on the Russian con-
sulting firm RBK’s top 500 ranking in 2017) and 
the country’s richest businessmen according to 
Russian business is trying to minimise 
the losses which would be caused by 
potential sanctions.
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the 2017 Forbes ranking. Premier Dmitri Med-
vedev even joked that any officials who had not 
been named on the list should consider resign-
ing from their posts. Since the list does not dif-
ferentiate the members of the Russian political 
and especially business elite according to the 
degree of their proximity to the president, and 
omits entirely some of its members who belong 
to the president’s ‘inner circle’, it does not pose 
a serious threat to the Kremlin. That is why, on 
the one hand, the Russian government reacted 
with positive surprise, in particular at the Amer-
ican administration’s decision not to introduce 
new sanctions. 
On the other hand, the Russian authorities’ re-
actions revealed that they still lacked a clear 
and unambiguous interpretation of the US ad-
ministration’s intentions and were uncertain 
what to expect in terms of future sanctions 
policy. Moscow is aware that the risk of the US 
introducing further sanctions has not passed, 
and the US administration may take such 
a step at any time. In particular, the report also 
includes a confidential section which may in-
clude information much more detrimental to 
Russia’s government. This is why Moscow also 
has a problem with interpreting the signal sent 
it by the Trump administration, which for the 
time being has not expanded the sanctions, but 
has drawn up a very superficial list of members 
of the political-business elite. The Kremlin is 
unsure whether this signifies weakness on the 
part of the American government and a desire 
for a limited normalisation of relations and 
cooperation, or whether it is a sophisticated 
strategy for harassing Russia with continuous 
threats and preparations for imposing harsher 
sanctions on the country at the US’s conven-
ience. Commenting on the publication of the 
American report, President Putin admitted that 
Russia had been waiting for its publication, and 
was preparing to respond to it by taking real 
actions that would “reduce relations with the 
United States to zero”. Nevertheless, he stated 
that for now, such steps were deemed unneces-
sary. On the contrary, he stressed that Russia is 
ready to patiently build up its relationship with 
America to the extent that the latter was ready 
to do the same.
Putin’s reaction to the published list seems to 
have been addressed primarily to Trump him-
self, and is aimed at continuing to play off the 
differences between Trump on the one hand 
and Congress and the American establishment 
(the ‘deep state’) on the other. Putin’s state-
ment is based on the assumption that Trump 
– in contrast to the political establishment – is 
looking for ways to improve relations with Rus-
sia. His reaction is a signal to Trump that the 
Russian president appreciates the fact that the 
announcement was not accompanied by any 
additional sanctions, and that therefore he is 
not going to complicate matters for Trump by 
taking any retaliatory steps. At the same time, 
Putin has indicated that if the US escalates its 
sanctions policy significantly, he will be forced 
to respond, thereby further hindering Trump in 
his declared goal of improving relations with 
Russia and exposing him to attacks from Con-
gress and his political opponents.
The Kremlin list which the US published was 
met with surprise by Russian analysts and ex-
perts. They faulted the American administra-
tion for its lack of professionalism and its igno-
rance of the situation in Russia. They pointed 
out that the list, while supposedly naming per-
sons closely associated with President Putin, 
also includes businessmen who have little con-
nection with the Kremlin, such as the Ananyev 
brothers (who have just had Promsviazbank 
On the one hand, the Kremlin was posi-
tively surprised by the US’s decision not to 
introduce new sanctions, but on the other, 
it is afraid that Washington may be plan-
ning a sharp increase in their restrictive-
ness in the near future.
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taken from them) and Yuri Shefler (a producer 
of alcoholic beverages who has been living out-
side Russia for 15 years). At the same time, it 
omits many of the people (like Sergei Roldugin) 
whose close ties to the President (including fi-
nancially) have been reported in journalistic in-
vestigations based on the disclosed documents 
about tax havens (such as the Panama Papers 
and the Paradise Papers). The Russian experts 
were also surprised at the list of government 
officials, which omitted many high-ranking 
people who have cooperated with the Krem-
lin such as Elvira Nabiullina, the President of 
the Central Bank, and the Chechen leader 
Ramzan Kadyrov.
Experts have pointed out that, on the one hand, 
the effect of publishing this list could be counter-
productive for the US. Persons who have found 
themselves on the list ‘unfairly’ could close ranks 
behind President Putin in the current situation, 
resulting in greater consolidation of the business 
and political elite. On the other hand, absence 
from the list could ‘stigmatise’ other members 
of the political elite, who may be forced to prove 
their loyalty to the Kremlin. In contrast, being 
named on the list is a serious problem for Rus-
sian businessmen who operate on international 
markets, as this would make conducting busi-
ness with them more risky. For example, most 
likely due to potential sanctions in January 2018, 
the buyout for US$1 billion by the American 
company Halliburton (which offers its services 
to petroleum extraction projects) of 100% of 
the shares in the Novomet Oil Services Holding 
(based in Perm) will have to be cancelled.
Summary
• The US government has intentionally in-
creased the ambiguity and unpredictability 
of its process for extending sanctions against 
Russia. The American administration has ob-
tained great freedom and flexibility in applying 
them. For example, in the case of the sanctions 
against the armaments sector – apart from in-
formation about the 39 Russian entities which 
are potentially vulnerable to restrictions – the 
criteria for ‘essential’ transactions detrimental 
to the interests of the United States or its allies 
have not been specified. The US government’s 
clear aim was to create a range of flexible tools 
for use against Russia, in order to deter the 
Kremlin from taking any action which could be 
aggressive and/or harmful to the United States, 
its allies and partners.
• One important feature of the potential new 
US sanctions against the Russian defence sec-
tor is their extraterritorial nature. Cooperating 
with Russian entities can also lead to sanctions 
against their foreign partners from third coun-
tries (both natural & legal persons and state 
institutions), even those allied with the United 
States. For example, in a situation when Rus-
sian armaments contractors are also involved in 
transactions on the American market, the intro-
duction of sanctions against them could lead 
to the cancellation of some Russian export con-
tracts in the defence and industry sector. In this 
sense, another aim of the sanctions is to narrow 
Russia’s room for cooperation in sensitive are-
as, and to deter other states from undertaking 
such cooperation.
• The preparation of the report concerning the 
members of the Russian elite did not result in an 
automatic expansion of US sanctions, although 
it has created a potential threat to those indi-
viduals and entities. However, this list presents 
an incentive for the United States and interna-
tional organisations to monitor transactions 
The US administration has great free-
dom and flexibility in imposing sanc-
tions on Russia, which is an important 
instrument of pressure on the Kremlin.
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by the Russian entities named on the list. This 
document also gives American authorities the 
option of launching unexpected, targeted re-
sponses and undermining contracts signed with 
Russian entities.
• As a result, the American list could cause fur-
ther tensions within the Russian political and 
business elite, especially since it is not known 
what is contained in the report’s confidential 
part, or whether any sanctions will be im-
posed against the persons named therein. The 
mere announcement that new US sanctions 
might be imposed caused visible concern in 
the Kremlin and among the Russian oligarchs. 
The latter had already lobbied for months in 
the United States against being added to the 
list of those cooperating with the Kremlin. 
Meanwhile, the Russian government has tried 
to make it easier to repatriate capital to Russia, 
which shows that the Kremlin sees the risk of 
rising dissatisfaction among the business com-
munity, and is trying to calm unsteady nerves. 
At the same time, in recent months the Kremlin 
has tried to create a semblance of readiness for 
the normalisation of relations with the Unit-
ed States (including by undertaking ‘peaceful 
initiatives’ in Syria and Ukraine). The above 
demonstrates that even without further sanc-
tions, their desired effect has to some extent 
been achieved. 
• What shape Russian-American relations and 
Moscow’s policy towards Washington assume 
depends to a large extent on whether and to 
what degree the Trump administration will in-
troduce new sanctions. Three main scenarios 
are possible:
1. Withholding new sanctions in the coming 
weeks/months, or the introduction of merely 
symbolic sanctions, will be read by the Kremlin as 
a signal of the US’s weakness, and strengthen the 
Russian leadership in its belief that it should con-
tinue its aggressive foreign policy. This will most 
likely increase Moscow’s assertiveness and dis-
courage it from making any concessions.
2. If the US introduces comprehensive, deep and 
very painful sanctions, especially in the run-up to 
the presidential elections in Russia (18 March 2018), 
this will put the Russian authorities in a difficult 
position, as Russia has a relatively limited potential 
to respond adequately to the US in the sphere of 
economics. The Kremlin would deem such a move 
to be a direct attempt to remove Putin’s team from 
power, and would thus move the conflict with the 
US into areas where it has better instruments than 
in the economic sphere (military, cyberspace, hy-
brid actions), and can undertake actions intended 
to show Washington the cost of further deepening 
the conflict with Russia. These could include strik-
ing at American interests through the escalation of 
regional conflicts, the implicit support of attacks 
on US forces, or a series of cyber-attacks against 
the United States and its allies.
3. The introduction by the United States of 
severe but precisely targeted sanctions may 
prompt Moscow to intensify its attempts to al-
leviate the conflict with Washington by making 
real concessions on contentious issues (such as 
Ukraine, North Korea or the Middle East), includ-
ing by limiting its actions in these regions which 
are damaging to US interests, and possibly by 
providing limited support for Washington in the 
resolution of regional problems. 
